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Abstract 
Contemporary criminology is witnessing something of a “visual turn” and as researchers 
develop their methods of enquiry it is clear that interdisciplinary scholarship will play a key 
role in shaping inventive approaches in it. But this should be in a context where there is a 
strong awareness of what different disciplines do and a sharpened sense of what they can 
bring to debate, not a naïve, eclectic or lowest common denominator interdisciplinarity. In 
this paper, I discuss some of the different ways art historians have “read” images and the 
multiple connections they have forged to understand an artwork. The discipline of art history 
itself has undergone some fundamental changes since the 1970s and the first section sets out 
some of the “old” and “new” methods in more detail, before turning to how these approaches 
have been mobilized in a single example: Titian’s Flaying of Marsyas, which dates from the 
1570s, and is among the most disturbing images in the entire history of art. By focusing on 
this painting the different intellectual positions and controversies surrounding an artwork are 
then outlined, to indicate the range and complexity involved in developing a convincing 
visual analysis.  
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The growing popularity of visual methods across the social sciences is a striking 
development over the last couple of decades or so, to the extent that Puwar (2009: 382) was 
moved to describe “the recent fetishisation of visual methods” in her introduction to a special 
issue on Bourdieu and post-colonialism. Contemporary criminology was rather late to 
recognize their use, even as Hayward (2009:12) cautioned against “simply importing images 
into a discipline defined by words and numbers” and encouraging instead “a new 
methodological orientation towards the visual that is capable of encompassing meaning, 
affect, situation, symbolic power and efficiency, and spectacle in the same ‘frame’” 
(Hayward 2009:12). I will have more to say on the tensions between “word” and “image”, 
where the word is associated with “law, literacy, and the rule of elites”, while the image is 
equated “with popular superstition, illiteracy, and licentiousness” (Mitchell 2015:13), later in 
this paper. Especially since they are deep seated and concern a certain privileging of textual 
narrative over visual description, even in disciplines like art history where one would expect 
this not to be so1.  
It is also the case that different approaches are often “reinvented over and over again 
without gaining much methodological depth and often without consideration of long-existing 
classics in the field” (Pauwels 2011:3). Such treatments are unhelpful, implying that method 
can be divorced from theoretical issues and ignores some of the fraught encounters that have 
shaped the use of visual material in and across disciplines. There are now many excellent 
guide books on using visual methods (see, for example, Adams, 2010, Pink, 2013, and Rose, 
2016) providing systematic evaluations of the different ways of doing research with visual 
material and how these approaches might be developed in the future. In what follows I 
concentrate on my own research, which focuses on the iconography of punishment and 
explores some of the dominant ways penal landscapes have been represented in the visual arts 
since the 1500s. The overall ambition is to indicate how punishment has an art history and by 
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studying it as such the suggestion is that the gap between the disciplines might be bridged. It 
is driven by the premise that the history of punishment and the history of art are linked in 
ways that have yet to be fully recognized. The discipline of art history itself has undergone 
some fundamental changes since the 1970s and the first section sets out some of the “old” 
and “new” methods in more detail, before turning to how these approaches have been 
mobilized in a single example: Titian’s Flaying of Marsyas, which dates from the 1570s, and 
is among the most disturbing images in the entire history of art. By focusing on this particular 
painting the different intellectual positions and controversies surrounding an artwork can be 
outlined, to indicate the range and complexity of developing a convincing visual analysis. 
Many of these arguments will be unfamiliar to a criminological audience, but what I hope to 
demonstrate is that this form of methodological juxtaposition can yield important insights 
enabling genuinely interdisciplinary scholarship to flourish.  
 
Iconography, Semiotics and Narrative 
The term iconography is derived from two Greek words: eikon, meaning “image”, and 
graphe meaning “writing” and is primarily concerned with the meaning, subject matter, or 
content of works of art. The method addresses the way “an artist ‘writes’ the image, as well 
as what the image itself ‘writes’ – that is the story it tells” (Adams 2010:43). The terms 
‘iconology’ and ‘iconography’ came to prominence in the early decades of the twentieth 
century and were associated with a succession of German scholars who laid the foundations 
for the modern discipline of art history, insisting that visual analysis involved a thorough 
knowledge of literary, biblical and mythological sources in order to grasp the intertextuality 
on which symbolic systems depend. They were concerned with the meaning of works of art, 
and their approach was a reaction against the predominantly formal analysis of how a 
painting looks, in terms of mood or colour, at the expense of the subject matter. Instead, as 
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one influential definition put it, “iconography is that branch of the history of art which 
concerns itself with the subject matter or meaning of works of art, as opposed to their form” 
(Panofsky, 1957:26). It is an approach emphasising the intellectual content of a work of art, 
how the symbols and signs in it would have been understood at the time it was produced.  
The iconographers distanced themselves from what came to be known as formalism, 
as set out in Wölfflin’s (1915/1950) Principles of Art History, which established a method of 
comparative visual analysis that studied paintings in terms of form and style. Although his 
terms were employed to capture the transitions from the classical style of the Renaissance to 
the Baroque, they have since become widely used outside his original formulation. He 
maintained that paintings could be analysed both in terms of their regional historical context 
but also in terms of formal oppositions between “linear” and “painterly” form, flatness and 
depth, and “closed” (schematic) versus “open” (illusionistic) form. Wölfflin’s approach 
deliberately ignores the subject-matter or “content” of paintings in order to concentrate on 
their visual appearance or form, and the two became the major, rival analytic strategies by 
which generations of art historians were taught to look at and to interpret images. Style as 
proposed by Wölfflin and iconography by Panofsky were set up as a contrast between “form 
and meaning” as the institutionalization of art history took hold and sought intellectual 
credibility.  
By the 1970s the discipline and its methods were increasingly criticized, along several 
dimensions, which have been summarized as follows: 
the narrowness of its range of subject matter and concentration on individual 
artists whom it classifies as geniuses; for its restricted set of methods, consisting 
chiefly of connoisseurship, the analysis of style and iconography, quality, the 
canon, dating arguments and biography, for the uniformity of degree curricula 
offered by departments of the history of art, for its ignoring not only of the social 
context of art, artists and public, but also structures of power, especially those of 
relations between art historians and the owners of valuable works of art; and 
perhaps most important of all, for the lack of attention paid to the changes which 
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had been taking places in the related disciplines of literature and history in the 
1960s. 
(Fernie 1995:18-19)  
 
The most serious charges laid here were the cardinal sins of being untheoretical and ignorant 
of the latest developments in continental philosophy. This insularity was all the more 
problematic given the sophisticated understandings of art these thinkers were developing. For 
example, Foucault’s (1966) extraordinary reading of Las Meninas, the enigmatic 1656 
painting by Velazquez, is one that completely bypasses conventional art historical methods 
and played an unwitting, but nevertheless significant role, in facilitating the critique of their 
limitations. Foucault’s analysis highlights the ways the picture works as a discourse, through 
describing how the complex arrangement of visual exchanges in it speaks to various subject 
positions in complex and uncertain ways. The significance of the painting rests in its self-
reflexive awareness of what it means to represent the world and for Foucault it illuminates an 
epistemic shift in Western culture, serving as a pivot around which his archaeologies of 
knowledge can then proceed. 
Likewise, Lacan used Holbein’s (1533) painting The Ambassadors in his 1960s 
seminars on psychoanalysis, the gaze and subjectivity. When the picture is viewed from an 
orthodox position, the viewer shares their confidence, vanity and mastery of all surveyed. But 
something strange, a shadowy phallic shape, blots the bottom of the canvas. It is only when 
the painting is glanced at an oblique angle, once the position of illusory control is vacated, 
does the smeared shape resolve into a human skull and the gaze come into full view. For 
Lacan (1977:92) “It reflects our own nothingness, in the figure of death’s head”. At around 
the same time Barthes (1967/1977) was proclaiming the “death of the author”, setting himself 
against the cult of biographical interpretation and the tendency to explain a work of art 
through some personal experience of the artist (as in Van Gogh’s madness or Tchaikovsky’s 
sexuality), a distorting tendency shifting our focus from language to a life. His argument is 
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not that the writer is irrelevant, but rather that the author figure is itself something of a 
fiction, and instead he sought to indicate how all human interpretation in society is filtered 
through language, and this includes non-verbal areas of communication. Indeed, it is this 
“stretching” of the concept of language to read as speech acts the messages of gesture, 
clothing, perfume, and so on, that is one of the defining achievements of semiology (Hawkes, 
1977:125). Semiology is a term coined by the founder of modern linguistics Ferdinand de 
Saussure (whose lectures were first published posthumously in 1915) to describe a general 
science of signs, of which linguistics is only one element. Saussure conceived it as a science 
that would study the laws governing signification, and this ambition remained just an idea 
until the 1960s when anthropologists, literary critics, and philosophers began to benefit from 
the methodological insights afforded by extending these theoretical propositions to social 
practices. 
Lacan’s overall project is one asserting the structural linguistic basis of 
psychoanalysis. It is the ability to speak that distinguishes the human subject, and which 
separates the social from the natural world. In Lacan the “talking cure” is founded on spoken 
truth, stressing the paradox that there is no subject except in representation, yet no 
representation can capture us completely. It is this “not here” and “not now” dynamic that 
Jacques Derrida exposes in his penetrating critique of structuralism. Derrida’s method was 
that of “deconstruction”, which meant both destruction and retrieval, and “brings into the 
open the ‘blind spots’ in all philosophical writing if not all creative writing” (Sturrock, 
2003:123). Informed by psychoanalysis he was more interested in failure and dysfunction 
than searching for the regularities of structure, upsetting the boundaries between philosophy 
and literature, to the extent that he shattered the very stability of language. Derrida’s strategy 
is to focus on a repressed theme, pursue its textual traces and indicate how they subvert the 
apparatus striving to hold them in place. In his critique of Saussure he notes how speech is 
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systematically privileged over written language, becoming a metaphor of truth and 
authenticity, which is also at the root of Derrida’s unease with Lacanian psychonalysis. 
Indeed, what Derrida brings to the fore is the politics of metaphor and by forensically 
studying the words of many influential philosophers he reveals how they have suppressed the 
unsettling effects of their own language. By problematizing the stability of meaning 
deconstruction paved the way for post-structuralist approaches to social relations. Lacanian 
psychoanalysis provided the fundamental conceptual and methodological apparatus for Julie 
Kristeva, but who maintained that Lacan concentrated too exclusively on verbal language at 
the expense of other modes of signification. Although she cannot strictly be regarded as a 
feminist, Kristeva drew on marginality, subversion and dissidence in her accounts of 
signifying practice and disruptive processes. Unlike Lacan she stresses all the sensory 
registers and not just the verbal, highlighting touch, taste, smell, sight and voice.  
Both Derrida and Kristeva were well aware of the achievements of structuralism, yet 
their interventions were decisive in contributing to the fragmentation of the approach and 
undermining its very foundations. While Derrida mainly concentrated on philosophical and 
literary texts, he also deconstructed works of art – most notably in his The Truth in Painting 
(Derrida, 1978) to explore the limits of interpretation, playing on the boundaries of a 
painting, what constitutes the “inside” and “outside” of the frame (a structure that itself 
occupies a transitional position). Kristeva’s (1972/1988) essay on “Giotto’s Joy” ties 
revolutions in the history of art with her own distinctive blend of semiology and 
psychoanalysis. She begins by noting the singular achievements of Giotto’s (1267-1336) 
frescoes, completed in about 1305 at the Scrovegni Chapel in Padua, where his paintings 
physically bond with the architecture depicting biblical and evangelical episodes. She then 
contrasts this “narrative symbolic sequence” and its “fidelity to ideological dogma” with the 
disrupting emergence of unconscious fantasy in the shape of “naked bodies, violence, sex, 
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death” in Giotto’s representation of Hell on the Chapel’s end wall, where the outlines of 
characters become “blurred”, colours “disappear,” “weaken,” or “darken”, and the “distinct 
architecture” of the frescoes on the side walls dissolve into “discontinuity, curves, and chaos” 
(Kristeva, 1972/1988:28-30). Kristeva (1982) is perhaps most well-known for the concept of 
“abjection” developed in her psychoanalytic study of fear, Powers of Horror. The abject, she 
writes, is “something rejected from which one does not feel part, from which one does not 
protect oneself as from an object. Imaginary uncanniness and real threat, it beckons us and 
ends up engulfing us” (Kristeva, 1982:4). Abjection produces disturbing feelings of 
exclusion, disgust and repulsion and has inspired new ways of thinking about the monstrous 
across the humanities.  
What must have been so attractive to Anglo-American art historians is how these 
French thinkers were able to effortlessly move from text to image without even changing gear 
and with almost complete disregard for traditional interpretive practices. Conceiving of the 
“status of painting as sign” was “fundamental for this alternative or New Art History” that 
regards “reading to be a complex and intricate a process”, while conventional iconography 
can just attend to the banal and trivial: left to “the comparatively simple decoding of emblems 
and motifs” (Bryson 1988:xvii). The emphasis on the work of art as a visual system of signs 
is the starting point for Bryson’s (1983:xii) break with conventional art history, which has 
privileged an understanding of painting as “the record of a perception”. It is a mode of 
cognition that is increasingly, since the fifteenth century at least, concerned with offering 
paintings that convincingly imitate the essential appearance of events and objects in the 
world. This mimetic doctrine can be traced back to the “aesthetics of antiquity” and has 
influenced much traditional art history, but seeing the making of marks in line and paint as 
copies of things in the world suppresses “the social character of the image” (id.) and ignores 
how the act of recognition organised in a painting arises from the interplay of political, 
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economic and signifying practices. In Bryson’s (1981:6) earlier study of French painting in 
the Ancien Régime he addresses the dichotomous relationships between “word” and “image” 
by examining the kind of stories pictures tell, drawing a distinction between the “discursive” 
aspects of an image (posing questions on visual art’s language-like qualities and relationships 
to written text) and those “figural” features that place the image as primarily a visual 
experience – it’s “being-as-image” – that is entirely independent of language. The tension 
between words and images was later explored by Bal (1991) in her Reading “Rembrandt” 
where she strives to reconcile a semiotics of visual art with a “narratology” of it, drawing on 
her background in literary studies she studied the interplay of verbal and visual elements to 
understand the role of narrative in pictures. In particular, she examines how a still image tells 
a dynamic story unfolding in time, identifying “how textuality determines the rhetorical 
effect of paintings” (Bal, 1991:31). In the rest of the paper I will indicate how these different 
interpretive procedures can be used to analyse a picture, in order to indicate something of the 
range and implications of their use.   
 
Reading “Titian”   
Titian’s (c.1570-1576) The Flaying of Marsyas (Figure 1) is considered by some to be among 
the greatest paintings in the Western canon, for others it is an intolerable image and are 
unable to look at it. There is no doubt that Titian intended viewers to be shocked by the 
cruelty of the scene. Even as representations of atrocious suffering were becoming 
increasingly popular among Renaissance and Baroque artists, it remains an unnerving and 
controversial picture. The paradox is an old one: how is that such a gruesome subject should 
become an aesthetic occasion, an indication of an artist’s greatness, inviting certain kinds of 
pleasure rather than as something to be appalled by. Indeed, the spectacle of death is 
“inevitably intertwined with all the contexts and values of every civilization, part or present” 
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(De Pascale, 2007:6). In the Western tradition, the Roman Catholic Church fostered for 
centuries an almost inexhaustible visual fascination with horrific torment. Yet the suffering 
deemed most worthy of representation is that which is “understood to be the product of 
wrath, divine or human” (Sontag, 2003:36). Of all the crimes and failings mortals can 
commit, in the eyes of the gods, the most serious is the failure to recognize the omnipotent 
power of the deities. In Titian’s rendering of a vindictive act of divine punishment we are 
pushed to the very limits of representation and as such it offers an exemplary instance of the 
complexities involved in analysing painting. As a first step, it is worth noting that the 
painting was only rediscovered in 1924 and not every art historian accepts the attribution to 
Titian (though it appears to have been in his studio when he died in 1576). There is still some 
dispute as to whether it is even finished, with researchers speculating that his workshop or 
even later artists added further touches after his death. Questions have also been posed as to 
whether the painting has been “trimmed at the sides” and whether it conceptually points 
“beyond its own boundaries” to a “lost accompanying work”, so that even this basic 
scholarship can be mobilised in a deconstructionist spirit, highlighting the impure boundaries 
of an artist and their work, so that a “Titian” is always referring to a “potentially collective 
author” (Held, 2008:184).  
 Equally we do not know if the painting results from a specific commission, or even 
when it was begun, adding further levels of ambiguity to the questions of why this 
mythological scene has been in painted in this way, and for whom, as well as when. It was a 
painting to which Titian returned to time and again, over a decade and a half, rethinking and 
reworking details, yet there is nothing else quite like it in his extraordinary output. This partly 
explains why Panofsky relegated discussion of it to a footnote in his posthumously published 
book Problems in Titian, Mostly Iconographic: 
Since I have never seen the original, which comes from the collection of Thomas 
Howard Earl of Arundel and Surrey (died 1646) and is now in the Archiepiscopal 
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Palace at Kromeriz, formerly Kremsier, in Czechoslovakia, I do not dare 
pronounce on the authenticity of the now almost generally accepted Flaying of 
Marsyas…It is admittedly difficult to attribute the painting to anyone else…but it 
is equally difficult to accept Titian’s responsibility for a composition which in 
gratuitous brutality (the little dog lapping up the blood) not only outdoes its 
model, one of Giulio Romano’s frecoes in the Palazzo del Te at Mantua, but also, 
and more importantly, evinces a horror vacui normally foreign to Titian who, like 
Henry James’ Linda Pallant, “knew the values of intervals.” In the Kromeriz 
picture no square inch is vacant. 
(Panofsky, 1969:171) 
 
Aside from the issue of Titian’s authorship of the painting, Panofsky is clearly troubled by 
both the formal tones of the picture (horror vacui is a term derived from the Latin “fear of 
empty space” and is used by art historians to describe the artistic practice of meticulously 
filling, or in some instances cluttering, a canvas with details) as much as the graphic cruelty 
on display. It has been argued that these misgivings are bound up with Panofsky’s attempt to 
locate the great Venetian master in a humanist pantheon, but the Marsyas is even more 
disturbing as it makes “Titian something other than a ‘humanist’” (Campbell, 2016:65) and 
explains it’s almost total excision from a lengthy chapter on “Titian and Ovid” in the book. 
Similarly there is no mention of it in Edgar Wind’s (1968:15-16) Pagan Mysteries in the 
Renaissance, which sought to unravel the use of allegory and “deliberate obliqueness in the 
use of metaphor” in “some of the greatest Renaissance paintings”, as “disguise is one of the 
great forces of revelation”. Again, it is an odd omission as the book is steeped in Neoplatonic 
thought, which in this context refers to how art can yield hidden wisdom, overcome 
contradictory human aspirations (such as between materiality and spirituality), and is 
characterised by the liberal values of responsibility and tolerance that is the hallmark of 
postwar iconological research2. Wind (1968:175) notes that the “torture of the mortal by the 
god who inspires him was a central theme in the revival of ancient mysteries” and its 
illustration inspired many variations on this subject in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 
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More recent scholars in the tradition have gone to considerable lengths to read the pictorial 
narrative in the Marsyas through allegorical exegesis and iconographic identification. 
 All begin by establishing that the origins of the monstrous scene lie in an ancient tale 
from Ovid, which tells the story of how the Olympian god Apollo had the satyr – a hybrid 
creature of human and goat – Marsyas flayed alive for having beaten him in a musical duel. 
Having learnt to play the primitive panpipe so well Marsyas was rash enough to challenge 
Apollo, the inventor of music and his cultivated lyre, to a contest in which the winner could 
inflict the punishment of his choosing upon the loser. Among the judges was the unfortunate 
King Midas3 and Apollo won by resorting to trickery, including playing his lyre upside down, 
which Marsyas was unable to do. Inevitably he loses, and Apollo claims the right to have 
Marsyas skinned alive. Ovid hardly mentions the contest, but relishes describing the torment 
that Titian later paints:  
Why do you tear me from my self, he cries? 
Ah cruel! must my skin be made the prize? 
This for a silly pipe? he roaring said. 
Mean-while the skin from off his limbs 
was flay’d. 
All bare, and raw, one large continu’d 
wound, 
With streams of blood his body bath’d the  
ground. 
The blueish veins their trembling pulse 
disclos’d. 
The stringy nerves lay naked, and expos’d. 
His guts appear’d, distinctly each express’d. 
With ev’ry shining fibre of his breast. 
(Ovid, 42BC-18AD, Metamorphoses, 383) 
 
An iconographic approach would then identify the individual figures in the painting, 
describing the extent to which it follows Ovid’s text and the elements that the painter adds of 
his own creation. 
 Marsyas is fairly easily identified and Titian has placed the huge body of the satyr at 
the centre of the picture, hanging upside down from a tree, emphasising his majestic 
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proportions. Some have read it as an allusion to da Vinci’s (ca.1492) famous “Vitruvian 
Man”, an inversion of one of the most “iconic Renaissance idealizations of the human” 
(Campbell, 2016:67) while others highlight the “immediate association to it is the Crucifixion 
of Christ” and Marsyas as “half-human, half-beast, is, after all, dual natured like Christ” 
(Hart, 2007:270). The scene further resembles the martyrdom of a saint – particularly St Peter 
who, it is maintained, was crucified upside down – and Marsyas appears as wearily resigned 
to his fate as any Christian martyr. In a further departure from Ovid’s graphic cruelty the 
torturers appear to be carrying out their gruesome task in rapt absorption, as if they are 
patiently conducting a medical anatomy. It has even been argued that “Titian projected his 
own self-portrait onto the figure of Midas, characterised as a melancholic” (Held, 2008:187), 
an impassive witness to the brutality he has unleashed. Identifying the various characters in 
the painting is clearly not straightforward, not least since the most difficult to discern is 
Apollo, some regard the musician as representing the deity and others insist that the kneeling 
figure with the laurel wreath holding a knife is Apollo. The musician has also been described 
as Orpheus, another legendary figure from ancient myth, around whom several stories centre 
on his musical abilities. Although Ovid’s text provides an important point of comparison for 
scholars, Titian’s visual composition is now also often compared to the design of a fresco by 
Giulio Romano for ducal residence in Mantua, as suggested by Panofsky above. It bears some 
remarkable similarities to the drawing (Figure 2) and is likely to have been a key inspiration 
as various elements from it have been appropriated by Titian. However, it significantly 
departs from the overt sexuality of Romano’s version, where the flaying clearly emphasises 
an imminent castration and the addition of a satyr child, along with two domesticated dogs – 
one lapping up blood, and the other drooling in anticipation – are further deviations from 
pictorial and textual conventions.  
14 
 
 At the deeper iconological level, which for Panofsky (1939/2009:222) meant 
reconstructing the “intrinsic meaning” of a painting, several of his followers have sought to 
apply humanist ideas to such an analysis. In this interpretive framework, there is an emphasis 
on Neoplatonic harmony, where “polarisations are overcome on the path of knowledge, in 
which the soul leaves the prison of the body, of matter, and returns to its divine origin” and 
on this reading “Apollo is redeeming the soul of Marsyas and is purifying him by flaying him 
and thus releasing the inner self” (Held, 2008:188). The stripping away of the skin from the 
body is an act of sacrificial purification, where the punishment of arrogance is also bound up 
with the triumph of music. Apollo claims victory over the sound of the panpipes, which 
dangle from the tree, also symbolising defeat. In her helpful summary of these interpretations 
Jutta Held explains how the layers of meaning are derived from medieval hermeneutics and 
theological allegory. As she puts it: 
For these interpreters, Midas and Apollo are the key figures, Midas is the 
saturnine artist, depicted in a gesture of melancholy, with whom Titian identifies 
himself and who is meditating on Apollo’s divine music (rather than on the god’s 
brutality!)…the arrangement of the figures, and thus the composition of the 
painting, supports this idea of integrating Marsyas as a creature of nature into the 
cosmic order. His navel forms the centre of the painting; a system of orthogonals 
and diagonals, the Golden Section, allegedly serves as the basis for the 
composition, which thus follows Neoplatonic or Pythagorean number 
combinations…This method of turning paintings back into geometric relations of 
proportion was an analytical procedure that was apparently supported by the 
theory of perception. 
(Held, 2008:188) 
 
Held is quick to point out that these harmonising interpretative procedures are closely tied to 
postwar art history practices4, that would come to be denounced as ‘old’ or ‘traditional’ 
approaches, as they have failed to acknowledge the very violence of the image and how it is 
bound up with absolutist power. Such a consideration yields up several possibilities that are 
explored in the next section, as they run counter to these orthodox views, and highlight 
additional meanings that are now taken to define the ‘new’ art history – though this term 
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refers to a range of developments that are highly diverse and often contradictory – but it had 
its origins in Marxist explorations of the economic and social context of art. 
 
Visual Abjection 
The iconographical approach is often criticised for its indifference to the social dynamics of 
art, preferring instead the immersion in biblical, literary and mythological sources to decipher 
symbolic systems. King Phillip II of Spain, for example, commissioned many classical 
mythology scenes from Titian and it has been convincingly argued that Phillip was less 
interested in Neoplatonic allegories than in possessing pictures of naked women, where a 
coarser and more erotic dimension to his compositions has been identified (Burke, 2001:40). 
In each of these images the figures (Actaeon, Callisto, Diana, Europa and Lucretia) are “all in 
some way subjected to the power of another actor, and, more than this, rendered abject in the 
process, their bodies becoming distinctly unlovely” (Zorach, 1999:244). This process of 
visual abjection is crucial to understanding the brutality on display in Titian’s depiction of the 
flaying of Marsyas. The huge body of the satyr dominates the scene, while Apollo is 
relatively smaller, kneeling and “driven by the wish to find the source of creativity” (Rösing, 
2013:105)5. If traditional art history had suppressed Apollo’s act of violence, then Marxist 
interpretations have addressed the ideologically charged meanings of the painting – the 
powerful will destroy those who attempt to challenge the established order. In some accounts, 
Apollo is regarded as the Catholic pope fighting Protestant heresy, while others see the 
painting as an allegory of the prince defeating his enemies and punishing the hubris of 
rebellious subordinates (Held, 2008:191). Writers in the Marxist tradition explore how social 
structures and cultural codes are mediated through visual representation, locating artworks in 
the contemporary conditions of material life and expressing specific class interests6. There 
has also been speculation that the painting was inspired by the flaying of a Venetian 
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commander, Marco Antonio Bragadin, at the hands of Turkish forces following their capture 
of the military stronghold of Famagusta in August 1571, which was on the island of Cyprus 
and had been a Venetian colony since the late fifteenth century (Puppi, YEAR:120). Yet 
turning to Ovidian mythology to offer a personal interpretation of a real-life execution is a 
“curious response” and while the report of Bragadin’s harrowing fate7 will have had 
traumatic repercussions in Venice it does seem to “more readily explain why work on the 
picture was broken off, not why it was begun” (Campbell, 2016:72). That the picture depicts 
the annihilation of an uncivilised, half-human creature by the god of beauty could suggest a 
nascent awareness of how European colonial violence was set to conquer the world and 
certainly speaks to the dialectic of master and slave.  
The subaltern does not look back defiantly, and the idyllic autumnal woodland setting 
is a further counterpoint to the cruelty on display, while the painting itself seems to be all 
about the different sensory experiences the medium engages. As one commentator notes the 
defining feature of the picture is skin: “human skin as opposed to animal fur, the skin as 
constitutive organ of the human being, the second skin of clothes and colour, the skin of the 
painter’s canvas, and even that kind of mental skin or canvas able to contain cruel pictures of 
invasion and fragmentation, be it in the mind of the artist or the spectator” (Rösing, 
2013:100). For another the experiences of sight and touch are the oppositional sensations 
sustained in the work (Campbell, 2016:75) and in this Kristeva’s understanding of the abject 
is especially important. The essence of the abject is the skin which forms on warm milk, it is 
“neither solid nor liquid”, and lies on the disturbing border “between the animate and 
inanimate” and has been compared to the fascinating yet repulsive feelings evoked by Titian 
through his use of colour, paint, flesh and leaky bodily matter across his later work (Zorach, 
1999:247). In Kristeva, the process of abjection is crucial to her post-Freudian 
psychoanalytical theory of the constitution of the subject, where a child learns to differentiate 
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itself from its mother. Differentiation can take various forms, but all must confront the 
repulsive sensation of abjection as we establish our fragile grip upon individual subjectivity. 
Consequently, the Flaying can be read as a visceral drama of subject formation, a narrative of 
“catastrophic separation or division” (Campbell, 2016:83), betraying a preoccupation with the 
boundaries of the human and the very origins of humanity.  
Further psychoanalytic readings have concentrated on the child in the lower right of 
the picture, as the only figure whose gaze directly addresses the viewer. The child witnessing 
a violent adult transgression “makes the scene a primal scene” (Rösing, 2013:107). In Freud, 
the term primal scene refers to the child’s fantasy of sexual activity between adults, 
particularly the parents, and answers the universal question of childhood: “where do I come 
from?” (Adams, 1993). The primal scene is closely related to the gaze and the power of sight 
to enchant the observer. It is in film studies that the theory of the gaze initially registered in 
Laura Mulvey’s (1975) highly influential essay on visual pleasure, sexual desire and 
patriarchal power. Drawing on Freudian and Lacanian concepts she argued that the 
organisation of looks in classic Hollywood film is structured to gratify the “male gaze” in 
three ways: the look from camera to scene; the look from the spectator to the action; and the 
looks between characters in the film. It did not take long for art historians to recognise the 
importance of Mulvey’s thinking, as it addressed the question of viewing that had long been 
absent from the modern discipline. There had been no problem studying the makers of art and 
celebrating the genius of individual artists, but “there was little by way of a corresponding 
focus on the function of spectatorship” (Bryson, 2001:6) and its explanatory power has meant 
that very few art historians have attempted to develop an alternative understanding of “the 
Gaze”.  
A key exception is Mieke Bal whose approach differs from Mulvey’s in fundamental 
ways. Although both share a political commitment to a feminist analysis of how sexual 
18 
 
difference is constituted in visual representation, they have contrasting ways of 
“understanding how vision unfolds in the field of power, Mulvey’s theory is optical, Bal’s is 
rhetorical” (Bryson, 2001:8, emphasis in original). In Bal sight is figured as semiotic, it is 
signs rather than scenes that are the fundamental building blocks of vision and her originality 
lies in considering visual art as a narrative. Specifically, she draws on a structuralist informed 
narratology, which maintains that all stories are told from a particular point of view, which 
she terms “focalization” and effectively disperses the gaze8. It is an approach that regards 
images as a language and involves not deciphering classical paintings as “word-for-word” 
translations of biblical, historical or mythical fables, but rather “an analysis of visual images 
as narratives in and of themselves that can do justice to an aspect of images and their effect 
that neither iconography nor other art historical practices can quite articulate” (Bal, 2001:54). 
She still maintains that images have to be interpreted and read, because artworks remain both 
“social” and “textual”, just like any other source of historical evidence, but she is careful to 
acknowledge the active nature of signification and that the occasion of meaning making is 
always located in particular contextual circumstances.  
As such the Titian painting invites interpretations informed by post-structuralist and 
deconstructionist ideas. Here attention is drawn to the ambivalent senses provoked by the 
“pictorial facts”, which each of the positions mentioned above attempt to subdue by imposing 
a consistent and authoritative interpretation of the painting. Some of the contradictions have 
been summarised as follows: 
There is evidence that argues in favour of regarding the significant meaning of 
the painting as lying in a just act of punishment (which is even seen as a 
redemptive deed to some extent); but there are also indications to support a view 
of the painting as, if not an objection to, then at least as a lamentation over the 
cruelty of the Olympian god. On the one hand, Titian brutalises the act of 
violence by having Apollo carry out the deed with his own hands…Apollo is thus 
not the god of cosmic harmonies, but primarily and palpably a murderous 
avenger. On the other hand, he is acting carefully and unemotionally (as if 
conducting an anatomical dissection), and does not appear as a passionately 
punitive god in the way that Michaelangelo’s Christ does in the Last Judgement. 
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(Held, 2008:191-2) 
 
There are further discrepancies, that I have alluded to earlier, and these conflicting readings 
will remain unresolved. Derrida terms this contradictory and elusive sense “différance” to 
convey the volatility of signification, as it combines both the structural meaning “to differ” 
(to be distinguishable from something else) with the temporal meaning “to defer” (to give 
way, yield to another’s authority). I do not want to suggest that the painting is an infinitely 
“open” text, where meaning is always “deferred”, rather that the methodological approaches 
discussed in this paper establish interpretive procedures that will involve certain exclusions, 
as meaning-making inevitably occurs within an already existing set of social relations: “the 
social frame does not ‘surround’ but is part of the work” (Bryson, 2001:5, emphasis in 
original).   
  
Conclusion 
In this discussion of ‘new’ and ‘old’ methods of art history I clearly have not exhausted the 
horizon of possibilities. I have not considered, for example, Titian’s use of colour in the 
composition and the almost frenzied manipulation of paint in the scene, which has struck 
many commentators, and has been regarded as a bold portent of modernism – more of the 
twentieth than the sixteenth century. Nor have I considered in any depth the complex human-
animal relationships depicted in the picture9. Instead, what I hope to have avoided are overly 
simplistic approaches and give a sense of how more recent interpretive procedures are aware 
of ambivalences, contradictions and plural readings. Although the readings are many, they 
are not infinite and nor are they arbitrary, the strength of Marxist, feminist, and 
psychoanalytic perspectives is that they each identify certain kinds of “structure” as central to 
their analysis. Of course, this raises important questions over their compatibility and their 
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subsequent deconstruction by post-structuralist thinkers indicates how methodological 
principles are often developed in conscious opposition to other theoretical positions.  
The distinction drawn between “old” and “new” art histories is also problematic, not 
least since much of what is “good about it was not new” and the term operates as a form of 
“ideological policing” that is too busy disqualifying predecessors to emerge as truly separate 
from them, where what is “new about it is not good” (Orton and Pollock, 1996:xviii). By 
setting out a broad range of possible interpretations of visual signification I do not want to 
suggest that “anything goes” and that interpretation is ultimately futile, nor invoke the facile 
conclusion that it all depends on the individual subjectivity of the interpreter. Instead I am 
persuaded by Bal’s (1991:13) insistence that a work of art is to be understood not as a given 
with a singular, unified meaning, but as an effect, a set of all possible readings: “it is not a 
dialectic resolution but rather a radicalization of the poles of opposition” that “leaves room 
for more than two kinds of meaning, and stimulates thinking about other possibilities”. Her 
major book Reading “Rembrandt” combines semiotic insights with a deep commitment to 
feminism and psychoanalysis to explore the interactions between words and images. It is a 
complex, but rewarding book full of methodological and theoretical inventiveness that offers 
a model of analysis of genuinely interdisciplinary scholarship. Given that so much visual 
criminology is concerned with traumatic events then it is vital that we develop our own 
“pictorial intelligence” (Alpers and Baxandall, 1994). In doing so we will need to borrow 
histories, theories and methods from our neighbours in art history, but we should not do so 
naively or eclectically. Instead, we need a strong sense of what it is that different disciplines 
bring to debates in these interdisciplinary times and to be able to intervene in them 
competently, critically and imaginatively. If this paper help prompt an awareness of different 
ways of thinking about images in criminology, then it will have achieved its aims.  
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Figure 1 Titian, The Flaying of Marsyas, c. 1570-1575, oil on canvas. 
 
Figure 2 Giulio Romano, Apollo Flaying Marsysas, c. 1525-1535, pen, ink and wash over 
chalk. 
 
  
26 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 In his introduction to a ground breaking collection of essays on art by leading French 
thinkers (including Barthes, Baudrillard, Foucault, Kristeva and Serres) Bryson makes the 
point that so much anglo-american art history “reacts to the image by seeking documentation: 
that is where it does its reading – in documents” and he occasionally has the “sense that 
patronage studies, in particular, will read anything rather than read the painting” (1988:xvi, 
emphasis in original). The collection was explicitly designed to address this audience and 
highlighted the importance of reading a painting as a semiotic sign and opened up this world 
to the then contemporary currents in “critical theory”, which had become the umbrella term 
to cover feminism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, postcolonialism and poststructuralism. This 
movement transformed art history as an academic discipline and was foundational to the 
“new” art history that had begun to invade and challenge the tranquil domains of the visual 
arts. Scholars from various disciplines, most notably from literary studies and philosophy, 
have migrated to the field and revitalized art history, suggesting there is much to be gained 
from pursuing interdisciplinary strategies and crossing disciplinary borders. 
2
 Wind was a student of Panofsky and was among a group of scholars who used to meet in 
Aby Warburg’s library in Hamburg in the years before Hitler came to power and was part of 
the great diaspora of Central Europeans, most of them Jewish, who sought refuge abroad with 
the advent of Nazism. Panofsky emigrated to the United States in 1933 and Wind played a 
key role in moving Warburg’s library to London and establishing the Warburg Institute, so 
that knowledge of the iconographical approach spread widely in the Anglophone world after 
the war. Indeed, Wind was to be the first professor of art history at Oxford (under the Faculty 
of Modern History) from 1955 until his retirement in 1967. 
3
 He does not appear in Ovid’s version of the Marsyas story, but was the judge in an earlier 
dispute between Apollo and Pan, and being notorious for his foolishness voted against 
Apollo, and so infuriated the god that he punished Midas by transforming his ears into those 
of an ass. This story is told by Ovid in Metamorphoses XI, 146-93, while the Marsyas story is 
in Metamorphoses VI, 382-400, and there are many further variants in the tradition of the 
myth. 
4 Wind (1968:173) notes how the “musical contest between Apollo and Marsyas was 
therefore concerned with the relative powers of Dionysian darkness and Apollonian clarity; 
and if the contest ended with the flaying of Marsyas, it was because flaying was itself a 
Dionysian rite, a tragic ordeal of purification by which the ugliness of the outward man was 
thrown off and the beauty of his inward self revealed.” For some commentators Marsyas 
represents the pure, wild Dionysian spirit of art, which must be tamed by the Apollonian 
aspect of it, blending with the laws of harmonious proportion and found in the music of 
strings. On this reading the significant meaning of the painting is that it is an act of 
redemption, rather than a portrayal of gratuitous cruelty, a metaphor of transformation, and 
ultimately harmony (Salisbury, 1993).  
5
 Melanie Hart (2007:277) has insisted that some of the figures in the painting represent 
different attitudes to suffering and creativity, noting the psychotic disposition of Apollo: the 
lack of empathy, the vengefulness and cool obsession – dissecting the body in such a way as 
to find out how a mere mortal can rival himself as a maker of beautiful music. In the novel 
The Silence of the Lambs the homicidal genius Hannibal ‘the Cannibal’ Lecter advises the 
FBI agent Clarice Starling to see the painting, in her efforts to track down a schizoid serial 
killer who flays the bodies of his victims. Dr Lecter advises: ‘“When you’re back in 
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Washington, go to the National Gallery and look at Titian’s Flaying of Marsyas before they 
send it back to Czechoslovakia. Wonderful for details, Titian – look at helpful Pan, bringing 
the bucket of water”’ (Harris, 1988/1990:143). I am grateful to Mark Bushell for pointing this 
out to me. 
6
 The tradition can be traced back to the work of émigré Marxist art historians such as 
Frederick Antal, Arnold Hauser and Meyer Schapiro who were marginalised in the Cold War 
but pioneered what is often termed the “social history of art”. It became influential in the 
1970s, most notably in John Berger’s (1972:33) book and television series Ways of Seeing, 
which called for a radically new way of looking at the “entire art of the past” so that it now 
becomes a “political issue”. He insisted that works of art have become “holy relics”, 
surrounded by an “atmosphere of entirely bogus religiosity” (Berger, 1972:21), and then 
explained how the ideological ties between painting and property are usually ignored by art 
experts and historians. The book and television series were intended to be polemical, and 
generated heated responses not only from traditional art historians and treasure houses, but 
the challenges were taken up and art history’s centre of gravity shifted and encouraged art 
historians to “break their own mould” (Rees and Borzello, 1986:6). 
7
 He was first “dragged around the walls, with sacks of earth and stones on his back; next, 
tied onto a chair, he was hoisted to the yardarm of the Turkish flagship and exposed to the 
taunts of sailors. Finally, he was taken to the place of execution in the main square, tied 
naked to a column, and, literally, flayed alive…” (Freedberg, 1986:150 in FMR 45). It was 
reported that 350 Venetian soldiers were massacred and the grisly details of their demise will 
have shocked Venice, but within weeks the Venetian fleet defeated that of Turkey at the 
battle of Lepanto so that fear turned to joy and according to Freedberg (id.) the deeper 
meaning of the Marsyas legend for Titian was that “torment in the end laid truth bare, and as 
in the Christian legend, sacrifice begot redemption”.  
8
 In her study of the semiotics of rape in two versions of the Lucretia theme by Rembrandt 
(1664 and 1666), which was an originary myth in Roman culture, the story is told from 
Lucretia’s viewpoint (Bal, 1991). This was certainly not the case in Rembrandt’s principle 
source, in Livy, where the rape of the virtuous Lucretia by the son of the leading Tarquin 
dynasty leads to their overthrow and the foundation of the Roman republic. Lucretia, having 
been raped, kills herself to prove her chastity and the myth makes the “woman’s violated and 
dying body serve the purpose of masculine political power” (Pollock, 1999:158). In both 
Rembrandt’s portrayals, the story appears to be reversed, showing the consequences of the 
rape for Lucretia and her inability to tell it except through masculine terms.  
9
 Piers Beirne (forthcoming) has attended to the meaning and effects of animal imagery in 
eighteenth century art in his efforts to develop a nonspeciesist criminology, while the 
exchange of letters between Katya Andreadakis and her father, John Berger, over the 
relationships between flesh and fur in Titian offer further startling insights into the painting 
(see Berger, 2015:67-80).  
